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Which Law Through Which War? Law Through War
Revisited
PROF. DR. PIERRE D'ARGENTt

Four years ago, David A. Westbrook published Law
Through War, in the winter issue of this very Review.! That
essay was the result of a long process of maturing thought,
the first drafts of the paper having been written back in
1993, in Louvain-la-Neuve, where, making our ddbuts as
young scholars, we met. I have had the chance to witness
the slow emergence of that essay, and to entertain with
David (or, hereafter, Bert) many conversations, real and
virtual, over the arguments and thoughts he so elegantly
assembled. So, when the editors of the Buffalo Law Review
asked me to write an "essay," I thought addressing publicly
the thoughts of my friend, with whom I had discussed so
much, would make sense. On an even more personal point,
after much wrangling with myself and much hesitation
about the subject of this paper-European writers on legal
doctrine are not used to letting their minds loose in public,
reaching the inconclusive positions that are so typical of
"essays"-I consider it only fair to use the thoughts of Bert
as my starting point, since I suspect he is behind this request that nearly transformed some nice summer weeks
into a torturous experiment.... So, he wants an essay.
Here he has one, on his own terms.
Two more objective and more serious reasons actually
explain my intent to revisit Law Through War. The first is
that I consider it a remarkable effort to confront honestly
the difficult moral and legal questions that post-Cold War
uses of armed force have raised. Bert's articulation of the
new "grammar" of international law, as well as the harsh
problems flowing from it, has unfortunately received less
attention from the community of scholars than I think it
t University of Louvain, Belgium.
1. See David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299, 299347 (2000). Subsequent citations to pages in this article immediately follow the
quotations or propositions in the body of the text.
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deserves. My revisitation is therefore firstly an invitation to
(re-)read the 2000 essay. This said, I do not intend this paper as an apology. The time for Festschrifts, hopefully, is
not here yet! Besides, Law Though War itself calls for debate and criticism. My second "objective" reason is much
more somber. Since 2000, the United States has, with
varying international support, engaged in two major military efforts, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It therefore remains to be seen how the visionary character of Law
Through War, which makes it so interesting and worth
meditating, can be said to describe what has happened
since the essay was published, and how the essay's warning
still resounds.
LAW THROUGH WAR IN A NUTSHELL

For the sake of convenience, the following introduction
will very shortly report a general understanding of Law
Through War, leaving aside many of the related interesting
developments that make up the essay and give it its flavor.
The essay describes itself "as a preliminary step toward a
jurisprudence of warfare." (301) After some introductory remarks, the essay is articulated in three parts, which develop three main arguments.
The first part of the essay describes the shift in thinking about international relations resulting from the end of
the Cold War. Bert categorizes influential descriptions of
the post Cold War landscape as either progress theories or
culture theories. Whatever their intrinsic differences, the
two types of theory have very similar strategic implications.
Those are to see the world as a dangerous place rather than
a place where enemies occupy a certain space; a place
where no balance of power has to be fine tuned but where
democratic forces confront a certain form of political wilderness that has to be controlled, and even transformed,
converted to the liberal order. The underlying argument is
that we have come to see the world as divided between
"Civilization and Barbarism," as the title of this first part
suggests. Those words, loaded with the dark history of
European colonialism, have, however, to be taken seriously
anew, because, while every people and every nation are,
jure et de jure, presumed to be civilized, situations of barbaric violent disorder erupt, be it in Europe (e.g., Bosnia,
Kosovo), Africa (Rwanda, Congo, Sudan), Asia (Afghani-
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stan, East Timor) or elsewhere. Hence, "barbarism" is
used not to describe a particular culture, a people or a country; the word is used to describe a factual situation characterized by the dislocation of social order, the transformation
of politics into chaotic killings, and suffering when war
lords replace public authorities, relying on blind violence,
drug trafficking, corruption and ancient hatreds or irrational creeds in order to cling to power. This distinction
between a civilized world and a barbaric world informs the
policies of the former when it comes to contemplate using
military force in the latter. In a certain way, this distinction
"inclines us to military intervention." (303)
Hence, logically, the second part of the essay deals with
"International Law and War." It argues that "war has
become an element of international law and is no longer an
object" of it. (303) After having outlawed war, international
law has begun to legalize it. The reason why war, classically
understood as the pursuit of national politics by other
means, has changed is, fundamentally, because international law itself has changed in two ways.
First, international law no longer pretends to be the
opposite of war. Most obviously, international law, through
the U.N. Charter, has integrated force in itself as a mean to
secure, or rather engender, compliance with its commands.
Even if the potential of the Charter has only been revealed
after the end of the Cold War, this legal change had been
envisaged in San Francisco back in 1945 where it was understood that the provisions of the Pact of the League of
Nations and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact were insufficient to
provide collective security. Outlawing the "private" wars of
States had to go together with a mechanism allowing for
"public" wars; i.e., public order violence. International law
has also changed in another way, which explains why the
first change has been possible. International law is no
longer perceived as the result of consecrated or mediated
national interests; it appears to be a "precondition for political action within the civilized world." (328) In other
words, international law has become the expression of
common values and common purposes, truly transcending
national politics and interests by preconditioning their expression. In that new international legal order, sovereignty
is no longer the ultimate value and explanatory conceptual
tool. The intrinsic autonomy that it expresses is rather the
result of the "participation in the civilized order." (329) The
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fact of departing from that participation opens the way for a
possible forcible disrespect of formal sovereignty. Needless
to say that the traditional notion of statehood, becoming in
a way conditional rather than purely factual, is put under
very much pressure by these propositions.
"What law do we give our wars?" (302) is the question
explored by the third part of the essay, entitled "Civilizing
Violence." The reader will be disappointed if (s)he is waiting
for definite answers to that difficult question. Rather than
clear answers, this last argument "suggests ways we may
begin to think about our capability for violence" (303) by
discussing some realities in American politics and history.
By concluding with powerful words-"we moderns fight
wars in order to prepare people for politics" (346)-, the essay refers once again to the distinction between barbarism
and civilization, not without stressing that our own fears of
seeing social ties dissolving at home if barbarism is left unchecked abroad might explain our haste to engage in forcible actions. Not without warning us also that by judging
barbarism by default and by too easily justifying political
violence, we may come close to engaging ourselves in barbaric acts for the sake of upholding our vision of civilization.
Even if this summary does not stress that point, the
first and third parts of Law Through War are actually very
much embedded in American realities. The question asked
at the very beginning of the essay-"how should we Americans begin to think about using our capacity to make war?"
(299)-is always present as a concrete political issue for a
specific polity. No doubt, the question is also the result of
an overwhelming and unchallenged military capacity
which, as such, is never really questioned. The fact that the
U.S. military superiority, as a choice and not simply a fact,
is never questioned by the essay might lead the reader to
think that it seems to be implicitly considered by Bert as a
positive factor of potential global order. Needless to say,
that view is not unproblematic and is not shared by all.
This is not the place to enter in that kind of geo-strategic
debate for which I must confess great ignorance, or, to put
it more scientifically, abyssal epistemological doubt. Whatever one might think of it, U.S. military superiority is a fact
and it would be foolish to think the world we live in without
taking it duly into account. This is just what the essay does:
Bert is actually not arguing for or against U.S. military
superiority. His essay tries to deal with the moral ques-
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tions, i.e. the responsibilities, that this very fact engenders.
So, because it is written very much from an American perspective, one has to be careful when reading the essay,
since some of the proposals it discusses are concretely out of
reach for most nations, even if international support-"or at
least explicit acquiescence" (333)-for the effort undertaken
mainly if not exclusively by the United States is recognized
as being desirable when hostilities are undertaken in the
name of civilization, or, at least, when they are conducted in
order to tame barbarism.
WHICH LAW?

It is one thing to argue that, in the forcible interventions of the post Cold War era, "we are legislating through
war." (334) It is another thing to define the legal product of
that forcible effort, to know what law we make through
war. This question is not related to the legal reasons justifying the resort to force, the law (be)for(e) the war. It is
about the legal principles upheld by war, about the legal
order imposed by it, resulting from it, the law made by the
war. Is this law a production of the war itself, the result of a
violent process? Or is this law predefined, elsewhere, and
implemented through the use of military coercion and eventually adapted on the edges in order to fit specific post-war
situations?
What is for sure, even at first glance, is that certain
predefined principles are obviously breached by a turmoil
labeled "barbaric" since that characterization justifies the
resort to force. In other words, seen from the other side of
the same coin, the legal principles that are the ones that
make civilization be what it is, i.e. civilized, are absent from
the barbaric situation. Hence the civilized intention must
be to establish the rules of civilization. Saying that is fairly
reassuring, because it seems to suggest that law, i.e., predefined legal principles rather than naked power, is implemented by war, or at least the sorts of war legitimated by
the new grammar. What brings less comfort, however, is
the fact that the essay lacks a concrete statement of the
rules that make up that law. At one level, the absence of
any reference to any specific predefined norm making civilization what it is can easily be explained. The debate is well
known and relates to tricky questions of "universalism,"
"relativism," or even "culturalism" in relation to basic
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human rights, even if general references to the U.N. Declaration on human rights, the 1966 Pacts, and some basic
provisions of international humanitarian law (like the
prohibition of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity) are fairly unchallengeable. One has to admit,
however, that saying that is not saying much, since the contrary does not make any sense. It would indeed be rather
surprising if States were fighting wars in order to suppress
those core rights officially. It should therefore not come as a
disappointing surprise if Law Through War is silent on this
point. More deeply, the essay does not reduce law to a set of
rules but conveys a larger understanding of it. Searching
for a normative understanding of our current wars, the
"law" it envisages as the end product of "war" is more
fundamentally what seems to be the right and just thing to
do through the incredible powerful tool of social change that
armed coercion is. Hence, the "law" envisaged "through
war" is actually not a predefined set of principles, being the
very ones breached by the combated barbarism. The "law"
envisaged is a production, rather than a predefined product.
This is all sensible, but creates unease. What has to
come through war-the law that war produces-cannot be
confused nor reduced to what has to stop with warbarbarism that can be technically expressed as the breach
of a range of rules. Is it possible to breach the gap, to reduce
the uncertainty and to affirm precisely what is the "law"
resulting from "war"? If, as Bert argues, the grammar of
international law now includes war, what if anything does
international law say about the end of war, the establishment of lawful peace? Precise answers are obviously impossible, even if they seem desirable, because otherwise the
power of the powerful seems all the more unchecked and
unlimited. This said, if one turns to the processes that have
emerged from the Afghan and Iraq wars of 2001 and 2003,
notwithstanding their huge differences, there are no doubt
some similarities. Among those are the constitutional processes that have been put in place in both countries. At the
time of writing, it was clear that none of those constitutional processes were unquestionable successes, as they
were still in progress. However, the purposes and intentions
of these constitutional processes are quite clear and fairly
similar: to enact a workable basic law that would bring both
countries in line with the fundamental elements of a democratic regime, where the power of the State is vested unto
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accountable institutions and the basic freedoms of the people protected. So, the general picture is fairly obvious.
This picture may falsely give the impression that the
"law" produced by "war" is actually predictable and not so
uncertain. This picture may also give the impression that
the "law" is just a nice word for western democratic imperialism. This is not really the case, even if the risk of misunderstanding calls for greater communicational skills and
efforts. Much uncertainty remains in the aftermath of war,
as does the variety of concrete domestic solutions. Above all,
those impressions tend to make observers oblivious of a basic fact, which is actually a fact of law: the "law" resulting
from contemporary "war" is, at the same time, limited by
and contained in two basic and quite traditional principles
of international law-the principle of self-determination of
peoples and the principle of territorial integrity of States.
This might sound very paradoxical. Let me explain by taking as an example the most debated of the recent U.S.
wars-the Iraq war of 2003.
WHICH WAR?

Before addressing the Iraq war of 2003,2 I would like to
stress that I do not intend to make arguments in favor of
the war, and that the incomplete thoughts of this essay do
not have to be understood in that way. Suffice it to say that
from the start I have had reservations-to say the least-on
the political wisdom and moral justification of the operation, as well as on its legal foundations. I'm not going to
comment on politics or morality. As I am writing, fairly
embarrassing reports for the U.S. and U.K. governments
are being published, and could fuel much debate on those
two last dimensions.
As far as the international law justification for the U.S.
and British invasion is concerned, just a few quick words.
As is well known, the official justification put forward by
the U.S. and the U.K. was not based on the legitimate toppling of a heinous regime or a certain form of preventive
2. The following pages are based on a paper presented in June 2004 at a
conference held under the auspices of the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and organized by the European Research Training
Network Applied Global Justice. See generally Right of Intervention Workshop,
Applied Global Justice, at http://www.worldrepublic.org (last visited Sep. 13,
2004).
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self-defense. Bureaucracies are much more refined than
that. The argument is as follows:' Resolution 678 of
November 1990 authorized the use of force to implement
Resolution 660 condemning the invasion of Kuwait and the
other following resolutions. Resolution 687 of 1991 had set
the conditions for the return to peace, including the disarmament obligations of Iraq. By Resolution 1441, paragraph
1, of November 2002, the Security Council unanimously
found Iraq in violation of Resolution 687. Hence, says the
U.S., the conditions for the return to peace were not
respected, and the authorization to use force contained in
resolution 678 could be relied upon.
Many things can be said about this argument. Among
the elements contradicting the official U.S. argument is the
fact that Resolution 687 itself provided for a peaceful
enforcement mechanism, by maintaining the economic
embargo as long as Iraq did not fully comply with its disarmament obligations. In a system where war is in
principle outlawed, any authorization to use force must be
strictly construed; hence, it is wrong to imply an authorization from a breach of cease-fire conditions. What few people
realize is that France, widely viewed as an opponent of the
U.S. administration on the Iraq issue, was actually not so
much in legal disagreement with the general line of the
U.S. argument. Both in Geneva and in Paris, I have heard
Ronny Abraham, director of the legal service of the Quai
d'Orsay, say that France did agree with the basic idea that
a violation of Resolution 687 opens the way for a revival of
the authorization to use force contained in resolution 678.
The only requirement, according to France, is that this violation has to be officially pronounced by the Security
Council, either in a resolution or in a presidential statement, as was done in 1993 when France took part in aerial
bombings of Iraq for failure to cooperate with the arms
inspectors. France recognizes that Resolution 1441, in its
first paragraph, officially finds Iraq in breach of its disarmament obligations. So far, so good: there is no difference
between the State Department and the Quai d'Orsay. The
difference-the only difference in legal terms-in the posi3. See Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the PermanentRepresentative of the
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Presidentof the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (2003),
availableat http://www.un.intusa/s2003_351.pdf (last visited Sep. 9, 2004).
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tion of the two governments is that France considers that
paragraph 12 of Resolution 1441 closed the door that was
opened by paragraph 1. By paragraph 12, the Security
Council "Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a
report [by Hans Blix], in order to consider the situation and
the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council
resolutions in order to secure international peace and security." By using "secure" instead of "restore" as was written
in the first U.S. draft, France considers the Security
Council to have resolved that peace existed between Iraq
and the Coalition, despite the breach of Resolution 687 officially pronounced by paragraph 1, and that therefore it was
up to the Security Council, after having "convene[d] immediately," to decide on an eventual resort to force, and not for
individual member States to rely on the thirteen year old
authorization.
Both arguments are worth what they are worth:
comprised of legal niceties, they are too subtle, too artificial,
and too legalistic to be really convincing. Only men in grey
suits and elegant ties, reconsidering the world on Friday
afternoons with a bottle of whisky and some decent cigars,
have time, education, and wit to think that way, and to
think they make real sense. It therefore comes as no surprise that the public was fed other justifications for the war.
From a purely legal point of view, however, one has to
recognize that the difference is very thin between the
opposing sides, whatever their political opposition. One has
also to understand that this difference could have been
legally bridged by a procedure. There is, in other words,
nothing substantive in the requirements of the Charter as
far as the Security Council action is concerned-not to
speak about jus cogens limitations upon the Security
Council, which are really just hypothesis for the books. Had
it wished to write "restore" instead of "secure," the Security
Council could have done so, and, according to the Quai
d'Orsay, thereby would have "legalized" the war. And to do
so, only a procedure has to be followed-nine positive votes
on 15, with no negative vote of one of the permanent members-, nothing else but a procedure.
I believe, and this paper will assume, that the Iraq War
of 2003 was illegal. But even if one has to hold the war to be
illegal, in breach of the Charter (and I say nothing on how
the war was waged nor about the way the occupation took
place), one has to recognize that this is far from ending the
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matter satisfactorily, especially when one knows precisely
where, technically, this illegality lies. The war was illegal.
Yes. And, so what? Is the illegality to be taken that seriously when one knows what it is made of? To be serious, to
oppose the war for such a legal reason is not really sufficient nor perfectly credible. Better reasons than this formal
legal reason exist to oppose the war. And had the war been
authorized, to be in favour of it just for legal reasons is a bit
irresponsible, since it would have been waged probably
along very similar lines and have created the same political
turmoil. Soldiers and civilians would also have been killed,
A1-Qaeda would also be rampant, and Saddam would also
be in custody, the crimes of his reign revealed.
This said, of course, procedure does matter. It is all too
easy to maintain that the war is the same with or without
explicit Security Council approval. After all, even an abolitionist can make the difference between stoning someone to
death and putting a convicted person on the electric chair
after a due process of law, even if in both cases a person
dies. If procedure does matter, however, it is not because
procedural rules matter for their own sake. It is because the
end product of following the rules is-for a range of various
reasons-not really the same thing as what results if the
procedure is ignored, despite the physical similarities that
can exist in both cases. Had the war been duly authorized
by the U.N. Security Council after the reported failure of
the weapons inspections, the aftermath of the war might
have been somewhat different. But with "if," you can put
Paris in a bottle, as we say in French. Hence, let us leave
aside the question of the legality or illegality of the resort to
force in March 2003 by the U.S. and the U.K. Instead, I
wish to address the way that (illegal) intervention has been
"digested" by the international system. In other words, I
would like to identify which legal principles serve to rationalize the end of that crisis. By doing so, one hopes to find
legal principles limiting and preconditioning the "law"
produced "through war."
The first thing to notice is that this war has not been
treated as an illegal act, as an act of aggression by the U.S.
and the U.K. Maybe this is because two (rich and powerful)
permanent members of the Security Council, being more
equal than many others, are concerned. Moreover, this is,
after the Cold War, a non-polarized world. Such political and legal realities must not be ignored, since they are
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intrinsically part of the system of today and there is no reason to think as if it were not the case. Regardless of the
questions of sovereign equality raised by international
acquiescence in this war, the fact of the matter is that the
classical consequences of aggression have not arisen-and
these are fundamental:
" Iraq has not been seriously considered in (collective) self-defense, and nobody came to help it at
its request;
* Saddam's regime has not been considered as a
government in exile that should regain its lost
power-on the contrary, Resolution 1483 of 22
May 2003 appeals to States to deny safe haven
"to those members of the previous Iraqi regime
who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and
atrocities and to support actions to bring them to
justice." (§3) Their functions have ceased following a situation that in former times would have
qualified as debellatio, so did their immunities;
* The duty not to recognize the consequences of the
aggression has not implemented. Indeed, the
Security Council has called the international
community to recognize the new Iraqi government that will be put in place after the
transitional period;
" The U.S. and U.K. forces have not been considered as illegal occupying powers that had to get
out of Iraq immediately-on the contrary, the
Coalition Provisional Authority has been recognized by Resolution 1483 and the coalition forces
have been authorized to stay in Iraq and use
force by Resolution 1511 of 16 October 2003
(§13);
" The U.S. and the U.K. are not considered to have
to pay war reparations,4 even apparently by the
new Iraqi authorities;
* No State-except Switzerland-has declared
itself to be neutral in the conflict and for that
reason has stopped to trade in goods that might
be of military use;
4. On the subject of war reparations, see PIERRE D'ARGENT, LES R9PARATIONS

DE GUERRE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: LA RESPONSABILIT9 INTERNATIONALE
DES ] TATS A L'9PREUVE DE LA GUERRE (Bruylant/L.G.D.J. 2002).
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" Most States have not forbidden the U.S. or U.K.
using their sea harbors or flying over their territories-sometimes with some political subtleties,
like allowing bombers to fly on the way back from
Iraq, after having dropped their bombs, but not
on the way in to Iraq...; and,
" States have not sanctioned the U.S. nor the U.K.
and have not taken counter-measures against
them for invading another state, an act that
many international lawyers like to call an erga
omnes breach of ajus cogens rule...

It is true that States have condemned the war, sometimes with very harsh words having legal connotation, and
that some have even used the infamous word "aggression."
This is probably important as far as the survival of the rule
prohibiting the resort to force is concerned, since it testifies
to an opinio iuris that the violation of the rule is treated as
such and not as the rise of a new rule-to use the logic of
the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case.5
My point, however, is not to demonstrate that the war has
not changed article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter.
Some have said that article 2, paragraph 4, died or has been
killed long ago. I simply do not agree. Resort to force is still,
as a matter of principle, prohibited, and the Charter still is
a binding treaty, for that matter, reflecting peremptory customary rules. Many international lawyers have put much
effort into proving that the illegal war of 2003 has not
changed the rules on the use of force. I could not agree
more, but I do not feel the need to agree with such a basic
statement, one that even the U.S. would not dispute. The
fact is that such a statement of general principles, like the
official condemnations on which it relies, does not explain
much- nor does the opposite contention.
So, be it as it may, what is to be explained? In order to
explain, one has to observe. What is for sure, is that the war
has not been "digested" by the international legal system as
an act of aggression. This does not mean that the U.S. led
invasion was not an act of aggression. The legal description
of the war is, however, of little importance when that
description does not trigger the application of the usual
consequences that go with it. So, what happened? I believe
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 186, at 98 (June 27).
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that two principles have emerged as founding commitments
of the settlement of the crisis, two legal principles have
been used to "digest" the illegal forcible intervention. Those
two principles of international law are:
1.Respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq: no annexation, no division of the country, no acquisition or
deprivation of natural resources; and
2.Respect for the right of the Iraqi people to some form
of self-determination and respect for its identity as a
nation, including its cultural heritage.
Those two principles can easily be traced in the preambles and in the operative parts of the various U.N. Security
Council Resolutions adopted since May 2003. They are
sometimes interwoven and linked in the same sentence of a
paragraph of a resolution.6 Maybe it is not surprising that
those two legal principles are fundamental to the resolution
of the crisis-after all, it would be politically unimaginable
to ignore them. That said, my point is considerably
stronger: those two principles that are at the basis of the
settlement, and hence have been left untouched by the
(illegal) war, are the very two principles protected by the
prohibition on using force.
War is illegal because territorial integrity is to be preserved. It is not a coincidence that war has been outlawed
just after all the territories on Earth were conquered. The
6. On the respect for territorial integrity and natural resources, see:
*S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. pmbl. 2, 1 20, 22,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/unsc
resolutions03.html [hereinafter Resolutions];
*S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg. pmbl. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1500 (2003), available at Resolutions, supra;
1, U.N.
*S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg. pmbl. 2,
supra;
Resolutions,
at
available
(2003),
S/RES/1511
Doc.
2, 3,
eS.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4987th mtg. pmbl. 3, 19,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004), available at Resolutions, supra.
On the right of the Iraqi people to some form of self-determination and national
identity, see:
*S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. pmbl. 4, 5, 7, 12, I 7,
9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003), availableat Resolutions, supra;
2, U.N. Doc.
*S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg.
S/RES/1500 (2003), available at Resolutions, supra;
1, 3, 6, 10,
*S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg. pmbl. 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003), availableat Resolutions, supra;
* S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4987th mtg. pmbl. 1, 4, 9, 15, IT 14, 9, 10, 12, 18, 24, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1546 (2004), available at Resolutions,
supra.
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outlawry of war is a way to freeze conquests. War is illegal
because national identities, some form of self-determination
of peoples, must exist. The outlawry of war is a way to allow
peoples on a territory to organize themselves as they wish,
to be what they are, to enjoy self-governance. All taken together, war is illegal because sovereignty is what it is: a
free people on a territory.
This view resolves the seeming paradox presented
above-namely, that for all the claims that the war in Iraq
was illegal ab initio, the world has not treated the war's
outcomes as illegal. The two principles that are the rationale for the prohibition of the use of force have not been set
aside by the recent war, but instead are at the centre of the
settlement. Some will say that bombs do not respect territorial integrity and that toppling Saddam's regime is not very
much respectful of the principle of self-determination.
Whereas there is some truth in the first argument, the
second is pure sophism, as it absurdly affirms that the former Iraqi regime represented the will of the people and was
freely chosen by it. Regarding the first argument, it actually
confuses affecting a territory with seizing a territory, even
if it is true that the prohibition to use of force is not limited
to a ban on annexations. To go back to my point: the use of
force in Iraq-even if procedurally illegal-does not contradict, nor does it endanger, the very reasons why war has
been outlawed. Hard to admit, but maybe, in some fairly
remote but nevertheless real ways, the illegal use of force
actually promotes, or makes way for, the legal principles
that are the rationale, the raison d'etre, of the rule prohibiting the use of force.
To put it in another way, I think what we are witnessing compels us to put under pressure, and to question, what
we have held for more than half a century to be the cornerstone of international law. Maybe the fundamental rule is
not the one we thought it was. Maybe the rule on the use of
force has been hiding the real law. We have thought of
international law as an order where violence had to be
outlawed. We have very often reduced (international) law to
that (negative) rule. Doing so, we have built an empty
system, knowing what we cannot do but ignoring what we
must do. Now that we can observe that the use of force,
even when illegal, does not necessarily endanger the very
substantive reasons for its prohibition, we do not have to
abandon that prohibition, we just have to see that law lies
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elsewhere than in that behavioral rule and does not necessarily depend on its (dis)respect. In other words, this is not
the end of international law as some have feared. This could
be the beginning of the maturity of its substantive principles.
ORDER AND LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE

Thus behind, or perhaps within, the dichotomy civilization/barbarism lie legal principles that explain not just why
we are willing to go to war, but the social order that
moderns seek to establish through the use of force. Perhaps
surprisingly, one has to recognize that this social order is
not very distant from the classical image connoted by
"Westphalia" of sovereign States living side-by-side. That
image has, of course, been redefined, and sovereignty today
is not what it used to be. Much has been said about sovereignty as an outdated concept. Yet peoples are still
struggling for independence and national interest is at the
centre of the political discourse of the ones who, while not
taking sovereignty abroad seriously, do not need to rely on
any formal claim of sovereignty to protect themselves. The
two principles identified-self-determination and territorial
integrity-nevertheless suggest that the current wars do
not disrupt that very liberal way of organizing social ties.
Failed or abusive governments may call for military interventions, as a last resort. Insofar as such interventions
create modern law, they do so not by suppressing, but by
reestablishing sovereignty, i.e., by allowing a people to be
able to regain control over its collective destiny on a certain
territory. This is very different from the wars that were
waged when international law came to outlaw aggression in
the first place, than the use of force in general. It is because
wars were not simply duels anymore-ways to settle disputes between kings-but were very potentially destructive
of sovereignty, that a legal change in the status of war
emerged: what was previously a freedom became a wrongful
act. The prohibition on the use of force was not only a way
to freeze conquest, it became a sine qua non legal requirement for the liberal Westphalian model of sovereign States
living side-by-side to survive. Now, we are witnessing wars
that are procedurally illegal but that do not substantively
endanger that model and its legal principles. The "law
through war" could be the law originally protected by the
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prohibition of war, and the politics resulting from the
current wars are most probably the modern politics of
Westphalian descent.
All this, no doubt, compels us to think again about the
place of violence within the international legal order.
Lawyers, especially international lawyers, too often think
that violence and law are contradictory and they forget that
no social order can be upheld without some form of legitimate violence. By being obsessed with the suppression of
violence, international lawyers have equated violence with
the absence, or destruction, of social order-and social order
with the absence of any violence, which is nonsense. No
doubt war is evil and even the best prepared and best
intentioned (humanitarian) intervention, be it U.N.
approved or not, kills innocents and brings suffering. To
recall the obvious, war, however legally justified, raises
very serious moral concerns. This does not mean, however,
that war is outside the law. Indeed, the paradox that I have
described, and which also exists in cases of humanitarian
interventions, requires us to reconsider the legal character
of the use of force. To be sure, this question can be phrased
in legal terms, around a legal rule. But arguing around the
rule does not inform us at all about the deeper law, the law
structuring the social order, that the rule is supposed to
uphold and protect. When, as in Iraq, violation of the prohibition on war does not negate the fundamental legal principles of the social order that are supposed to be protected by
the prohibition, one has to think of the real sense in which
the breach of the prohibition was essentially formal.
Despite formal illegality-i.e. the absence of a U.N.
authorization-, could a forceful intervention be legitimate
because its end product respects, or even promotes, selfdetermination of peoples and territorial integrity as understood above? The legitimacy of the resort to force does not
only depend on its results. The goal does not always justify
the means. So, what does produce legitimacy? It would be
foolish to pretend to answer that question, which has
haunted jurisprudence since its foundations. When asked in
relation to the use of force within the discourse of public
international law, however, any answer to that impossible
question must take into account the fact that the outlawry
of war, first understood as a contractual undertaking not to
resolve "private" disputes between States through violence,
has received a new institutional and social meaning with
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difficult to sever comthe U.N. Charter. Hence, it seems of using force from the
pletely the question of the legitimacy
legally transformed war.
institutional framework which has
Perhaps inevitaAre we back to procedural considerations?
is what comes to the
bly. Not just because procedure (s)he has exhausted all
lawyers' mind when (s)he thinks
to the time and
other avenues. But because, according
principles of the fragile
place, upholding the substantive many different ways. To
in
liberal order can often be done
allow for debate and, so,
choose the right one, procedures common good. At least, it
for the collective identification of
is so hoped.
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